【NAPF】没有核武器，世界会更好

通过拥有核武器来恐吓和威胁敌方，从而阻止对方的进攻。要么停止进攻，要么同归于尽。这样的核威慑理论，我们大概听了不下万遍。但本文作者认为，核威慑没有任何威慑作用。他觉得，我们没法证明核武器曾阻止过任何战争，或它将会阻止任何战争，甚至核武器的存在会导致其他难以挽回的错误。

没有核武器，世界会更好

作者：David Barash

译者：尹子梦 李林治

校对：徐唱

策划：朱雨晴

The deterrence myth

核威慑真的有用吗？

本文选自 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation | 取经号原创翻译

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Nuclear deterrence continues to dominate international relations. Yet there is no proof it ever worked, nor that it ever will

核威慑在国际关系的议题中仍占据主导地位。但没有证据能证明核威慑曾经有效，或者未来会有效。

In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology, one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.

英国资深军事历史学家和战略家劳伦斯·弗里德曼在他的经典著作《核战略的演变》（1989）中总结道：“核威慑就算没什么衣服都没穿，他仍然是皇帝。” （译者注：皇帝的新衣） 尽管全身赤裸，这位皇帝还是 趾高气昂地走着 、享受着名不符实的 尊重 ，并把全世界置于险境之中。核威慑已成为一个有潜在 致命性的 理论。尽管它受到越来越多的质疑，核威慑依然维持着巨大的影响力。

strut /strʌt/ v. to walk proudly with your head high and your chest pushed forwards, showing that you think you are important 趾高气扬地走；高视阔步

deference /'def(ə)r(ə)ns/ n. polite behaviour that shows that you respect someone and are therefore willing to accept their opinions or judgment 顺从

After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’ Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a seemingly rational arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD, appropriately enough). Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves.

1945年，美国在广岛和长崎投下核弹。战争由此改变。在那之前，军事力量的 首要 目的显而易见就是去赢得战争。但根据美国著名军事战略家伯纳德·布罗迪于1978年所写：“此后，军事力量的首要目的必须转变为避免战争。除此之外，军事力量再无其他实际意义。”核威慑由此诞生——一项看似合理、通过共同毁灭原则的威胁来促进和平稳定的策略（“共同毁灭原则”简称M.A.D.机制，意为“疯狂”，真是再合适不过了）。更重要的是，核威慑这一军事策略虽经不起推敲但普遍被认为合理，更被政府用作配备核武器的挡箭牌。

overriding /ˌovɚ'raɪdɪŋ/ adj. more important than anything else 最重要的；高于一切的

Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny.

然而，即使通过简单的观察就能发现，核威慑其实名不副实。核威慑承诺带来力量、保障和安全，而大众正是被这光鲜的外表欺骗。一旦用批判性的眼光去审视它，被吹捧为具有深层战略意义的核威慑就会轻而易举地被 瓦解 。

crumble /'krʌmbl/ v. to lose power, become weak, or fail 衰落, 崩溃

Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny.

让我们从核威慑理论的核心开始考虑：即核威慑是有效的。核威慑的支持者坚持认为我们应该对它心怀感激，因为即使在美苏这两个超级大国关系剑拔弩张的情况下，核威慑也为我们避免了第三次世界大战。一些支持者甚至认为核威慑为苏联的解体和共产主义的失败奠定了基础。按这样的说法，西方的核威慑阻止了苏联侵略西欧，并使世界摆脱了共产主义暴政的威胁。

There are, however, compelling arguments suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several possible reasons, most notably because neither side wanted to go to war. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Logically speaking, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now.

然而，还有一些 令人信服的 观点认为美国和前苏联没有世界大战的原因可能有好几个，其中最主要的是双方都不想打仗。的确，在核时代之前，美国和俄罗斯就从未有过战争。如果认为冷战从未升级为热战的唯一原因是核武器，就好像认为一辆没有引擎或车轮的废旧汽车从未驶离停车场的唯一原因是没人转动车钥匙一样。从逻辑上说，不管在冷战期间还是现在，都没办法证明是核武器在维持着和平。

Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: ‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’ The neighbour protested: “But there aren’t any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: ‘You see, it works!’ We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace.

支持核威慑的 狂热分子 就像是每天在自己草坪上 喷洒 香水的女人。当邻居 困惑 地询问这种行为时，她答道：“我这样做是为了防止大象靠近。”邻居反驳：“但离这儿10000英里以内没有大象，”然后这个女人答：“你瞧，这方法很有效！”我们不该因为和平得以维护而对我们的领导人或核威慑理论大加赞赏，更别说对核武器心存感激了。

perplexed /pɚ'plɛkst/ adj. confused and worried by something that you do not understand 困惑的;糊涂的

What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable.

我们能说的是，到今天早上为止，那些有能力 消灭 生命的东西还未发作，而那些有能力用核武器消灭生命的人也还没有发动攻击。但这不能完全令人感到欣慰，历史也不再让人安心。自二战至冷战结束的“核和平”期只维持了不到五十年。保证不使用核武器的唯一方法就是确保不再有核武器。我们没有理由去相信核武器的存在是用来避免使用它。确保人类不发动核战的第一步可能是显示核威慑这一“皇帝”没穿衣服，这样才有可能找到一些更适合的方法替代这一错误的想法。

exterminate /ɪk'stɝmə'net/ v. to kill large numbers of people or animals of a particular type so that they no longer exist 消灭;根绝

In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future.

总之，我们没法证明核武器曾阻止过任何战争，或它将会阻止任何战争。

Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs .

而且核武器也不能阻止无核国家对有核国家的攻击。1950年，中国距研制并部署自己的核武器还有14年之久，但美国已经有了十分完备的核武器库。然而，在朝鲜战争中，当胜利的东风吹向南边时，美国的核武器库也没能阻止中国把30多万名军人送过鸭绿江。这导致了朝鲜半岛分裂至今的 僵局 ，也是世界上最危险且未得到解决的 僵局 之一。

stalemate /'stelmet/ n. a situation in which it seems impossible to settle an argument or disagreement, and neither side can get an advantage (争执的)僵持,僵局

Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990.

简而言之，核威慑起不到威慑作用。这一规律意义深远并四处可见。有核的法国没能成功镇压无核的阿尔及利亚民族解放阵线。同样，美国的核武器没能 阻止 朝鲜在1968年扣押它的情报收集船普韦布洛号（即使到今天，这艘船依然掌握在朝鲜手中)；没能左右中国军队在1979年进军越南，阻止后者入侵柬埔寨；没能阻止伊朗革命卫队在1979至1981年间俘获美国外交官并扣为人质；也没能让美国及其盟友在1990年不通过战争就迫使伊拉克从科威特撤军。

In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes . They weren’t. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way.

在《核武器与胁迫外交》（2017）一书中， 政治学家唐德·塞舍尔和马修·福尔曼调查了1919至1995年间发生的348起领土争端。他们通过统计分析检验在应对领土 争端 时，有核国家是否比无核国家更能 迫使 对手服从。答案是否定的。不仅如此，核武器也无法增强一国的底气以提出更多要求；就算有的国家可以，他们达成目的的可能性也将变得更小。

coerce /ko'ɝs/ v. to force someone to do something they do not want to do by threatening them 迫使做;强迫, 强制

escalate /'ɛskəlet/ v. to become higher or increase, or to make something do this (使)更高, (使)更大

This also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons.

这同样说明，就算伊朗或朝鲜 获得 核武器，他们也无法威胁其它国家——无论他们的“目标”配备的是核武还是传统武器。

It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting.

可以肯定，核威慑未必有威慑作用，也未必可以提供胁迫性力量。然而伴随它的超高风险更是让人怀疑它的可靠性。

First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility . A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.

首先，通过核武威慑他国缺乏 可信度 。一位配备核武背包的警察未必能震慑劫匪：“我以法律的名义叫你停下，不然我们就同归于尽！”同样，在冷战时期，北约的将军曾 哀叹 ，只消不到两千吨当量的核弹就能摧毁西德的城镇。这就意味着如果要用核武保护欧洲，西德就会消亡（ 译者注：如果核战争爆发，西德将成为主战场） ，所以（苏联）红军会受到核威慑的说法真的是无稽之谈。总而言之，精工制造更小、更精确的战略武器会更加有用；也因此，在危急时刻部署这样的武器会更可靠。但当被 部署 的武器更加有用、比威胁手段更加可靠时，它们也会更容易在非危急时刻被使用。

lament /lə'mɛnt/ v. to express feelings of great sadness about something 悲叹；悔恨；哀悼

deploy /dɪ'plɔɪ/ v. to organize or move soldiers, military equipment etc so that they are in the right place and ready to be used  (尤指军事行动)使展开; 施展; 部署

Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.

其次，核威慑有效的前提是，各方的军火库都 无懈可击 ，或者一方在受攻击后至少拥有“核反击”的 报复性 能力，从而制止第一次的攻击。然而，随着时间的推移，核弹打击越发精确。这使人们担忧这些武器受到打击后是否还有“反击”的能力。越发精准的核武，以及核威慑理论中的“核武器还击弱势”，都明显增加了第一次进攻的可能性。当各方都相信先下手为强时，局势就会变得动荡不安。

invulnerable /ɪn'vʌlnərəbl/ adj. someone or something that is invulnerable cannot be harmed or damaged if you attack or criticize them 不会受伤害的；无懈可击的

retaliatory /ri'tæliətəri/ adj. done against someone because they have harmed you 报复的

Third, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.

第三，核威慑理论会假设决策者是最理性的。核威慑相信那些手握着核武发射器的人在极大压力下也能够既保持冷静，也对全局有完整的认知。它同时也假定领导人能始终掌握自己的力量，控制自己的情绪，仅凭战略成本与收益做出冷静的决定，而不会意气用事。简而言之，核威慑理论声称各方都会用最骇人和无法想象的后果把对方吓得魂不附体。接着再把自己塑造成最 深思熟虑 和理性的一方。但实际上，所有关于人类心理的知识都表明这很荒唐。

optimal /'ɑptəml/ adj. the best or most suitable 最理想的；最佳的

Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise.

试想一位出现精神疾病征兆的美国总统：令人恐惧的是，他的言论和推特总是与痴呆症或者精神病症状一致。不管国家领导人有没有核武，他们都有患精神疾病的可能性。但是核威慑理论的假设前提却不是如此。

Finally, there is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated